What if the new president of France does not win them next month ?
BY MICHEL GURFINKIEL.
François Hollande, the socialist
candidate, won the French presidential election on May 6. He got 51.63% of the
vote against 48.37% for the incumbent conservative president, Nicolas Sarkozy.
Quite a good score, even if Sarkozy did much better than expected.
However, the presidency is only a first
step. A lot will depend on the National Assembly elections, which are due to
take place on June 10 and 17. If the socialists and their allies secure
themselves an absolute majority, Hollande will enjoy quasi-monarchical powers
for five years. If they do not, he will be a lame duck.
Americans are familiar with similar
scenarios, except the United States Constitution provides a clear-cut
separation of powers and thus preserves many of the presidential powers and
prerogatives, even against a hostile or uncooperative Congress. Whereas the
French Fifth Republic constitution, a creation of Charles de Gaulle in 1958,
combines — in an uneasy and uncertain way — presidential and Westminsterian
features, and thus turns any conflict between the powers into a ballistic
zero-sum drama. In theory, France is not ruled by its president, as in the
American presidential system, but rather by its prime minister who, as in the
English Westminsterian system, is answerable to the National Assembly. As long
as both officials are political partners, the president — endowed with such
special powers as the right to call for an early election or a referendum — is
a de facto but undisputed CEO. When they belong to different and competing
parties, the prime minister takes over.
De Gaulle perfectly understood the logic —
or the illogic — of his system: he made clear that the president, once deprived
of electoral support, had no choice but to resign. He actually acted
accordingly in 1969, when he abdicated following a failed referendum on
comparatively minor issues. Things changed, however, when François Mitterrand,
the Fifth Republic’s first socialist president, was faced with a conservative
National Assembly in 1986: instead of resigning he agreed to become a lame duck
— but a lame duck with teeth who made full use of his residual powers in order
to undermine the cabinet, to hasten its fall, and to win a reelection in 1988.
A conservative and allegedly Gaullist
president, Jacques Chirac, followed in 1997 when his party lost an early
election he himself had called. For the five ensuing years, he “cohabited“ (to use the authorized
French expression) with Lionel Jospin, the socialist prime minister. Both under
Mitterrand and Chirac, cohabition led to such ridiculous situations as the
president and the prime minister of France together attending international
summits like G7 or the European Council.
Things went even further in 2002, when
Jospin introduced — with Chirac’s assent — a constitutional revision that
shortened the president’s term from seven to five years. Since the Assembly is
also elected for five years, the obvious outcome was that the parliamentary
election would closely follow the presidential one. It worked to Chirac’s
advantage upon his reelection in 2002, and then to Sarkozy’s advantage in 2007.
Hollande is convinced that the same will
be true about him next month. But will it? There is at least one precedent that
he should consider. After being reelected in 1988, Mitterrand called an early
election to get rid of the 1986 conservative National Assembly. What he got was
a lame Assembly with a relative but not an absolute majority for the socialist
party, and a weak centrist minority that could not act as a steady ally. Five
years later, he lost the 1993 parliamentary election and was reduced to a lame
duck position again. Since he was then dying of cancer, he could not again
mastermind a socialist revenge; on the other hand, he was treated in an
extremely respectful and dignified way by the day’s ruler, conservative Prime
Minister Edouard Balladur.
Can the Right actually wrest the National
Assembly from Hollande next month? It is not wholly unthinkable. First and
foremost, one must remember that the main factor for Sarkozy’s defeat was his
personal unpopularity, and not just among the Left — which hated him from the
onset in the most irrational way — but also among the Right, which felt he had
not implemented the platform he had been elected for in 2007. Even given such
unpopularity, Sarkozy managed to win back most of the conservative vote.
What, then, of a new and less
controversial conservative leader? For the time being, there are three
potential leaders. Jean-François Copé, the UMP (conservative party) boss, is an
overambitious young man who opposed Sarkozy on many issues but is nevertheless
seen as a Sarkozy’s clone (a bad point). François Fillon served as Sarkozy’s
underling prime minister for five years and enjoyed some kind of popularity
among conservatives for looking more conservative than his boss, but he could
not possibly cut it against Hollande. Alain Juppé, the mayor of Bordeaux and a
former prime minister under Chirac, seems to enjoy as much gravitas as Hollande
and could actually be up to the job.
A second argument for a conservative
rebound next month is that a socialist parliamentary victory would subject
France to a one-party regime. The socialists and their allies would control the
presidency, both houses of Parliament (the Assembly and the less consequential
Senate), the government, almost all regional councils, most counties, and most
big towns. They would, in line with France’s statist character, control the
media, the academic sphere, and many of the most important industries even more
tightly. Sarkozy declined to mention this throughout his campaign for
reelection — another mistake of his. I have noticed that Nadine Morano, a
Sarkozy archloyalist and a rising conservative star, started talking about it
right after Hollande’s election.
A third argument is that Marine Le Pen,
the National Front leader, and François Bayrou, the centrist maverick, may have
lost some of their luster. Both declined to support Sarkozy on the presidential
second round. Le Pen said her voters were free to act as they wished. Bayrou
said that while he would vote for Hollande, he would allow his voters to decide
for themselves. That ran against the wishes of most of their respective
supporters. Most National Front voters switched to Sarkozy in order to defeat
Hollande at any cost; most Bayrou voters supported Sarkozy or abstained. A new
conservative leader with charisma, vista, and guts could certainly get them to “vote for France” or to “vote for democracy” in June.
Hollande’s toughest challenge is to make
sense of his economic platform. The new French president is a follower of
Keynes: he believes in state control, high taxes, and extended welfare. The
fact that the global economy has undergone massive changes since the days of
Keynes and that Barack Obama failed while implementing similar policies in the
United States does not deter him. What he takes seriously, however, is the
European Union, which will not allow for too much state control, and the euro,
which does not allow for inordinate welfare spending. He can quit the EU and
the eurozone as both the Far Left and the Far Right recommend, a move that
would probably bring about a “Greek
effect” on the French economy. Otherwise, he can abide by European rules,
thus negating his platform altogether. Since both options are beyond him, he
frantically insists for a drastic “production-oriented”
and “people-oriented” revision in the
European and euro policies.
His European partners may listen to him to
a point. He may then tell the French that in order to overcome a very dangerous
situation a broader coalition or even a national unity government is needed,
and that a “socialist cum allies”
parliamentary victory may help.